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Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, 
and Consciousness
The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science
Evan Thompson
One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether con-
sciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of
Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless
sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of
this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya
view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining
consciousness as “that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when
we wake up or dream.” The Indian debate also offers new resources for contem-
porary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience
have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as
well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its rela-
tionship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indian
materials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that
which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind
training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and con-
sciousness.
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1 Introduction
Many neuroscientists and philosophers today
think  of  dreamless  sleep  (see  glossary)  as  a
blackout  state  in  which  consciousness  is  en-
tirely  absent.  Indeed,  they  often  appeal  to
this  apparent  fact  in  order  to  define  con-
sciousness: 
Everybody knows what consciousness is:
it is what vanishes every night when we
fall into a dreamless sleep and reappears
when  we  wake  up  or  when  we  dream.
(Tononi 2008, p. 216)
Consciousness  consists  of  inner,  qualitative,
subjective  states  and  processes  of  sentience
and awareness. Consciousness, so defined, be-
gins  when we wake in  the morning  from a
dreamless  sleep  and  continues  until  we  fall
asleep again, die, go into a coma, or otherwise
become “unconscious”. (Searle 2000, p. 559)
I will call the view that consciousness vanishes or
ceases in dreamless sleep the  default view of the
relationship between consciousness and dreamless
sleep. One aim of this paper is to argue that the
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Glossary
1. Canonical physiological sleep 
states according to polysomno-
graphy
“Light Sleep”
• Stage 1: closed eyes, slow eye-rolling movements, EEG alpha waves (8–12 
Hz) subside, slower theta waves (4–8 Hz) arrive.
• Stage 2: eye movements cease, 12–14 Hz bursts (sleep spindles) and brief 
high voltage waves (K-complexes) occur.
“Deep Sleep” or “Slow-Wave Sleep”
• Stage 3: a mixture of sleep spindles and high-amplitude, slow frequency 
delta waves (0.5–4 Hz).
• Stage 4: delta waves almost exclusively.
• REM (Rapid Eye Movement) or “Paradoxical Sleep”: fast-frequency, low-
amplitude waves, limb muscles paralyzed, eyes closed with rapid eye move-
ments.
2. Phenomenological sleep terms • Sleep mentation: sleep thoughts and images.
• Dreaming: immersion in the imagined dreamworld; “immersive spatiotem-
poral hallucination” (Windt 2010).
• Lucid Dreaming: knowing that one is dreaming while dreaming; being able
to direct one’s attention to the dream as a dream (Windt & Metzinger 
2007).
• Dreamless sleep (Western conception): sleep lacking mentation.
• Dreamless sleep (Indian conception): sleep lacking mentation; phenomenal 
character of peaceful, non-intentional awareness.
• Lucid dreamless sleep (Indian conception): sleep lacking mentation; phe-
nomenal character of peaceful, non-intentional awareness; non-conceptual 
meta-awareness (“witness consciousness”) of the dreamless sleep state.
Glossary of Indian philosophical systems
CONSCIOUSNESS IN DREAMLESS SLEEP
Yoga • Yoga Sūtras, traditionally ascribed to Patañjali, though authorship is un-
certain (c. 3rd–4th century CE). The commentary attributed to Vyāsa may 
in fact have been written by Patañjali.
Advaita Vedānta (Advaitins) • Śaṇkara (788–820 CE).
• Sureśvara (c. 9th century CE).
• Madhusūdana (c. 16th century CE).
Buddhism • The Theravāda school postulates a basal and passive “life continuum” or 
“factor of existence” consciousness (bhavaṅga) that occurs in dreamless 
sleep (c. 3rd century BCE–2nd century CE).
• The Yogācāra school postulates a basal “store consciousness” (ālaya-
vijñāna), which persists in dreamless sleep (c. 4th century CE).
NO CONSCIOUSNESS IN DREAMLESS SLEEP
Nyāya (Nyaiyāyikas) • Nyāya Sūtras, authored by Gautama (c. 2nd century BCE).
Vātsyāyana (c. 450 CE).
• Udyotakara (c. 550 CE ).
• Udayana (c. 10th century CE).
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default view is not as obvious or strong as it is of-
ten thought to be. Another aim is to propose that
we need a finer taxonomy of  sleep states than
that which sleep science currently employs, in or-
der to allow for the possibility of states or phases
of  dreamless  sleep  in  which  consciousness  is
present. There are forceful reasons, if not decisive
ones,  for  describing  certain  kinds  of  dreamless
sleep as modes of consciousness rather than as the
absence  of  consciousness.  These  reasons  derive
from the debate about dreamless sleep between
the Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya schools of Indian
philosophy (see glossary). Examining this debate
in the light of cognitive science raises important
conceptual and methodological issues for the cog-
nitive neuroscience of consciousness. Furthermore,
considerations  about  sleep  drawn  from  Indian
philosophy  suggest  new  experimental  questions
and protocols  for  the  cognitive  neuroscience  of
sleep  and  consciousness.  By  weaving  together
these different traditions—Western cognitive sci-
ence and Indian philosophy—I hope to show the
value of cross-cultural philosophy of mind for cog-
nitive science.
2 The experience of waking up
Before  turning  to the  Indian  debate,  I  would
like to motivate the examination of  dreamless
sleep and consciousness by considering the ex-
perience of waking up from deep sleep and what
this experience reveals about our experience of
the self. 
One of the best descriptions of waking up
comes from Marcel Proust. In a long passage at
the beginning of the first volume of  In Search
of Lost Time, the unnamed narrator describes
awakening from sleep:
A sleeping man holds in a circle  around
him the sequence of the hours, the order of
the years and world. He consults them in-
stinctively as he wakes and reads in them
in a second the point on the earth he oc-
cupies, the time that has elapsed up to his
waking; but their ranks can be mixed up,
broken. If towards morning, after a bout of
insomnia,  sleep  overcomes  him  as  he  is
reading,  in  a position  too  different  from
the  one  in  which  he  usually  sleeps,  his
raised arm alone is enough to stop the sun
and  make  it  retreat,  and,  in  the  first
minute  of  his  waking,  he  will  no  longer
know what time it is, he will think he has
only just gone to bed. If he dozes off in a
position still more displaced and divergent,
for instance after dinner sitting in an arm-
chair, then the confusion among the dis-
ordered worlds will be complete, the magic
armchair  will  send him travelling at  top
speed through time and space, and, at the
moment of opening his eyelids, he will be-
lieve he went to bed several months earlier
in another country. But it was enough if,
in my own bed, my sleep was deep and al-
lowed my mind to relax entirely; then it
would let go of the map of the place where
I had fallen asleep and, when I woke in the
middle of the night, since I did not know
where I was, I did not even understand in
the first moment who I was; all I had, in
its original simplicity, was the sense of ex-
istence as it may quiver in the depths of
an animal; I was more bereft than a cave-
man; but then the memory—not yet of the
place where I was, but of several of those
where I had lived and where I might have
been—would come to me like help from on
high to pull me out of the void from which
I  could  not  have  got  out  on  my own;  I
passed over centuries of civilization in one
second, and the image confusedly glimpsed
of  oil  lamps,  then  of  wing-collar  shirts,
gradually  recomposed  my  self’s  original
features. (Proust 2003, p. 9)
Proust depicts the moment of awakening from
deep sleep as one where we have lost all sense
of the self derived from memories of the epis-
odes of our lives. Instead of the autobiograph-
ical or narrative sense of self as a person with
a storyline through time, there remains only
the  sensation  of  existing  at  that  moment.
What marks the first instant of awakening is
not the self of memory but the feeling of being
alive, or what Proust calls “the sense of exist-
ence as it may quiver in the depths of an an-
imal.”
Thompson, E. (2015). Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness - The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to 
Cognitive Science. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 37(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570351 3 | 19
www.open-mind.net
The  moment  of  awakening  thus  reveals
two kinds of  self-experience.  The first  kind is
the embodied self-experience of  being alive in
the present moment, or the experience of being
sentient.  The second kind of  self-experience is
the autobiographical experience of being a per-
son with a storyline, a thinking being who men-
tally travels in time. The first kind of embodied
sense  of  self  we  experience  immediately  upon
awakening,  but  as  we reach  automatically  for
the  second  kind  of  autobiographical  sense  of
self, it sometimes goes missing.
This  distinction  between  two  modes  of
self-experience, one of which remains present in
the  sleep–wake transition  even if  the  other  is
lost, suggests the following tentative phenomen-
ological line of thought leading towards the idea
of consciousness being present in certain phases
of dreamless sleep.
Consider that although deep sleep creates
a gap or a rupture in our consciousness, we of-
ten feel the gap immediately upon awakening.
Our waking sense that we were just asleep and
unknowing is  not  outside  knowledge—like  the
kind  we  have  when  we  know  about  someone
else’s having been asleep; it is inside, first-hand
experience. We are aware of the gap in our con-
sciousness  from  within  our  consciousness.  Al-
though  we  may  forget  many  things  about
ourselves when we first wake up—where we are,
how we got there, maybe even our name—we do
not have to turn around to see who it was who
was just asleep and unknowing, if by “who” we
mean the sense of self as the embodied subject
of present-moment experience in contrast to the
sense of self as the mentally represented object
of autobiographical memory. This intimate and
immediate bodily self-awareness that we have as
we emerge from sleep into waking life suggests
that  there  may  be  some  kind  of  deep-sleep
awareness, operative at least for some stretch of
time prior to waking up, a taste of which we re-
tain in the waking state, despite there being no
specific mental content to recall.  If  there is  a
deep-sleep awareness we can retain in this way,
then there may, at least for certain phases of
deep sleep, be a phenomenal character to deep
sleep or something “it is like” (Nagel 1974) to
be deeply asleep—in which case consciousness
cannot  be  entirely  absent  from  deep  sleep
(Sharma 2001).
This  line  of  thought  finds  its  strongest
philosophical  expression  in  classical  Indian
philosophy,  so if  we wish to see  whether  we
can sharpen it  into a more compelling argu-
ment, we need to look at the Indian discus-
sions.
3 A classical Indian debate
In the earliest texts of the  Upaniṣads, dating
from  the  seventh  century  B.C.E.,  dreamless
sleep  is  singled  out  as  one  of  the  principal
states of the self, along with the waking state
and the dream state. Various characterizations
of dreamless sleep are given. Some texts char-
acterize it as a state of oblivion, while other
texts describe it as a mode of unknowing or
non-cognitive  consciousness  that  lacks  either
the outer sensory objects of the waking state
or the inner mental images of the dream state
(Raveh 2008).  It  is  this  second characteriza-
tion that we find in the later texts of the Yoga
and Vedānta schools. These texts also present
a  basic  form  of  philosophical  argument  for
dreamless sleep being a mode of consciousness.
The argument runs as follows: When you wake
up from a dreamless sleep, you are aware of
having  had  a  peaceful  sleep.  You  know this
directly  from  memory,  so  the  argument  as-
serts, not from inference. In other words, you
do not need to reason, “I feel well rested now,
so I must have had a peaceful sleep.” Rather,
you  are  immediately  aware  of  having  been
happily asleep. Memory, however, presupposes
the  existence  of  traces  that  are  themselves
caused by previous experiences, so in remem-
bering  that  you  slept  peacefully,  a  peaceful
feeling  must  have  been  experienced.  To  put
the thought another way, the memory report,
“I slept peacefully,” would not be possible if
awareness  were  altogether  absent  from  deep
sleep; but to say that awareness is present in
deep sleep is to say that deep sleep is a mode
of consciousness.
To my knowledge, the earliest version of
this  argument  comes  from  Vyāsa’s  third  or
fourth  century  C.E.  commentary  on  Patañ-
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jali’s  Yoga Sūtras.1 Patañjali  defines  yoga as
the stilling or restraining of the “fluctuations”
of consciousness (Yoga Sūtras I:2). When this
stilling  is  accomplished,  the  “seer”  or  “wit-
ness” can abide in its true form, namely, pure
awareness; otherwise the “seer” identifies with
the  fluctuations  of  consciousness—with  the
movements  of  thought  and  emotion  (I:3–4).
Patañjali  identifies  five  kinds  of  fluctuations
or  changing  states  of  consciousness:  correct
cognition, error, imagining or conceptual con-
struction, sleep, and memory (I:5–6), and he
defines sleep as a state of consciousness that is
based on an “absence” (I:10). 
As the traditional commentaries indicate,
“absence” does not mean absence of conscious-
ness; it means absence of an object presented to
consciousness.2 Deep and dreamless  sleep  is  a
kind of consciousness without an object. When
we  are  awake  we  cognize  outer  objects,  and
when  we  dream  we  cognize  mental  images.
When we are deeply asleep, however, we do not
cognize anything—there is no object being cog-
nized  and no awareness  of  oneself  as  knower.
Nevertheless, according to Yoga, we feel this pe-
culiar absence while we sleep and we remember
it upon awakening, as evidenced by our saying,
“I  slept  peacefully  and  I  did  not  know  any-
thing.”
Before  we  examine  the  debate  arising
from this argument, let me mention an obvi-
ous objection that  would occur to us today,
especially given what we know from sleep sci-
ence. The objection is that retrospective sub-
jective evaluations of sleep may be unreliable
(Baker et al. 1999), so we cannot assume that
the subjective feeling upon awakening of hav-
ing  slept  peacefully  is  based  on  a  veridical
memory of a peaceful sleep. An extreme case
of the unreliability of self-reports about sleep
comes  from  insomnia  patients  (Perlis et  al.
1997;  Rosa &  Bonnet 2000;  Zhang &  Zhao
2007). These patients frequently display sleep-
state  misperception;  that  is,  their  subjective
1 For a translation of the  Yoga Sūtras with Vyāsa’s commentary, see
Āraṇya (1983).  Other  useful  translations  can  be  found  in  Arya
(1989); Bryant (2009); Chapple (2008); Iyengar (1996); and Phillips
(2009).
2 Arya (1989, pp. 178–184); Bryant (2009, pp. 41–43); Iyengar (1996,
pp. 59–60).
assessments  of  the  quantity  and  quality  of
their  sleep deviate  strongly  from the  object-
ive, polysomnographic measures. For example,
they often identify themselves as having been
awake when they are woken up from polysom-
nographically-defined sleep, they tend to over-
estimate  sleep-onset  latency  (the  length  of
time it  takes  to go  from full  wakefulness  to
sleep), and to underestimate total sleep time
as compared with polysomnographic measures
(Perlis et al. 1997). Even in healthy individu-
als,  the  feeling  of  having  slept  well  could
sometimes  deviate  from  objective  measures.
One could feel refreshed upon awakening, yet
the objective measures might show that one’s
sleep was physiologically restless or intermit-
tent; or one could feel fatigued upon awaken-
ing,  yet  the  objective  measures  might  show
that one’s sleep was physiologically deep and
undisturbed. In short, although it is conceptu-
ally true that a veridical episodic memory im-
plies  having  undergone  an  experience  whose
content corresponds, to some degree, to that
of  the  memory,  it  is  an  empirical  matter
whether or to what degree any given waking
memory impression of sleep is veridical. It is
also an empirical question whether episodes of
peaceful sleep typically lead to the awareness
of  having  slept  peacefully  and  whether  this
feeling  can  occur  even  when  sleep  is  dis-
turbed.
This line of thought, however, is not de-
cisive  against  the  Yoga  argument.  Strictly
speaking, all this argument needs is the pos-
sibility of there being veridical waking memor-
ies  of  having  been  deeply  and  dreamlessly
asleep  in  order  logically  to  establish  that
awareness  can  be  present  in  at  least  certain
phases or types of dreamless sleep. The argu-
ment does not need to establish that waking
memory  impressions  are  typically  veridical,
only that they can be. Indeed, as we will see
later,  the Yoga viewpoint can allow that or-
dinary  sleep-state  perception  and  retrospect-
ive  subjective sleep-state evaluations may be
unreliable.  I  will  come back to this  point at
the end of the paper.
A more direct objection to the argument,
however, is to challenge the premise that wak-
Thompson, E. (2015). Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness - The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to 
Cognitive Science. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 37(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570351 5 | 19
www.open-mind.net
ing  retrospective  reports  of  sleep  are  ever
memory  reports.  The  philosophers  of  the
Nyāya  school  (Naiyāyikas)  make  this  chal-
lenge.  They  maintain  that  the  statement,  “I
slept peacefully and I did not know anything,”
expresses  an  inferential  cognition,  not  a
memory report, and that consciousness is en-
tirely  absent  in  dreamless  sleep.  Given  how
one feels upon awakening, one infers one had a
peaceful sleep and no memory of any dream-
less sleep awareness is involved.
Advaita Vedānta, in turn, argues against
the  Nyāyan  viewpoint.  The  debate  between
them focuses  in  particular  on  the  ignorance
occurring in  dreamless  sleep,  and specifically
on how we know or establish the waking re-
port,  “I  knew nothing.” While  we are asleep
we know nothing of  this ignorance; we come
to  know it  only  upon waking  up.  Yet  given
that we do not remain ignorant of our own ig-
norance, how is this knowing of  not-knowing
possible? The Naiyāyikas claim that we infer
we were ignorant because we do not remember
anything, but the Advaitins argue that retro-
spective oblivion is no proof of a prior lack of
consciousness. Moreover, when we wake up we
have  the  feeling  of  having  been  asleep  and
having not known anything. This feeling, the
Advaitins claim, is better regarded as a kind
of memory brought about by the traces of pre-
vious experience. So, in some sense, we must
experience  our  ignorance—the  unknowing
stillness of our mind—in dreamless sleep.
In reply, the Naiyāyikas claim that we have
no  consciousness  in  dreamless  sleep,  and  that
when we wake up we make an inference by reas-
oning in the following way: “While I was in deep
sleep, I knew nothing, because I was in a special
state (I was not awake) and I lacked the necessary
means for knowledge (my senses and mental fac-
ulties were shut down).” Of course, the Naiyāyi-
kas are not saying that we explicitly make this in-
ference when we wake up. What they are saying
is that what looks like memory is really a case of
implicit reasoning taking this inferential form.3 
3 My account of the Nyāyan position and of the Advaita Vedānta re-
buttal  relies  heavily  on  Gupta (1995,  pp.  56–66,  99),  and  Gupta
(1998, pp. 84–86). My account simplifies a number of the complexit-
ies on both sides of the debate.
In order to understand the kind of inference
that the Naiyāyikas think we make, as well as
why the Advaitins reject the Nyāyan position, it
will be helpful to state the inference in the form
of the standard Nyāyan syllogism, which forms an
important part of the Nyāyan theory of inferen-
tial knowledge. 
Suppose we are looking at a hill and you say
to me, “There is fire on the hill.” I doubt what
you say, however, so you need to convince me.
You point to the hill and say, “There is smoke on
the hill.” I see the smoke and I am convinced. Ac-
cording to the Nyāya, if we want to unpack how
perception and inference have worked together to
convince me that you are right, we need to formu-
late the inferential cognition in the following five
steps:
1. There is fire on the hill. 
[This is the proposition to be proven. It is what
you think when you look at the hill,  and it is
what you want to convince me is the case.]
2. Because there is smoke on the hill.
[This is the reason you give to support what you
say.]
3. Wherever there is smoke there is fire.
[This  step  states  the  universal  concomitance
between the presence of smoke and the presence
of fire.]
4. As in the case of the kitchen.
[This step provides an example or actual case of
the concomitance, to which we both agree.]
5. There is fire on the hill.
[This step states the conclusion, which is the pro-
position with which we began, but now stated as
established and generated by the preceding infer-
ential process.]
Let us now take this five-step syllogism and
apply  it  to  the  case  of  dreamless  sleep.4 The
Nyāya view is that our knowledge that we knew
nothing in dreamless sleep is based on the follow-
ing sort of inference:
1. While I was in dreamless sleep, I knew nothing
(there was an absence of knowledge in my self).
4 The following inference is my reconstruction of the Naiyāyikas’ reas-
oning  as  understood  by  their  Advaita  Vedāntin  opponents.  See
Gupta (1995, pp. 56–66, 99), and Gupta (1998, pp. 84–86).
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2. This is because (i) I (my self) was in a special
state  (that  is,  not  awake)  or  (ii)  I  (my self)
lacked the necessary means for knowledge (that
is,  my  senses  and  mental  faculties  were  shut
down).
3. Whenever (i) I (my self) am in a special state
(whenever I am not awake) or (ii) I (my self)
lack  the  necessary  means  for  knowledge
(whenever my senses  and mental  faculties  are
shut down), I know nothing (there is an absence
of knowledge in my self).
4. As in the case of fainting or a blow to the
head.
5. While I was in dreamless sleep, I knew noth-
ing (there was an absence of knowledge in my
self).
Notice  the  parallel  between the  previous
inference concerning fire and the present infer-
ence concerning dreamless sleep. In the previous
case, our concern is to establish the presence of
fire on the hill. In the present case, our concern
is to establish the absence of knowledge in the
self  during  dreamless  sleep.  Nevertheless,  the
form of reasoning is the same.
Again,  the  Naiyāyikas  are  not  saying
that  we  explicitly  go  through  this  inference
step by step when we wake up. What they are
saying is that we know by inference that we
were  ignorant  during  dreamless  sleep,  and
that our inference can be shown to be correct
when  we  make  explicit  all  the  steps  that  it
contains. So there is no need to suppose that
there  is  any  kind  of  consciousness  during
dreamless sleep.
The  Advaitins  respond  by  arguing  that
this inference is faulty and cannot be how we
know that there is an absence of knowledge dur-
ing sleep. The problem is that I need some way
to know or establish the reasons for  inferring
that I knew nothing—namely, that I was in a
special  state and that I lacked the means for
knowledge—and there seems to be no way for
me to do this without my relying on the kind of
memory these reasons were supposed to obviate.
The first  reason the  Naiyāyikas  give  for
me to infer that I knew nothing is that I was in
a special  state,  that is,  a state different from
the waking state. But how do I know that I was
in  a special  state?  If  I  say,  “Because  I  knew
nothing in this state,” then I am reasoning in a
circle.
The second reason the Naiyāyikas give for
me  to  infer  that  I  knew nothing  is  that  the
means for knowledge were lacking—that is, that
my senses and mental faculties were shut down.
But here too we need to ask, how do I know
that these means were lacking? How do I know
my senses and mental faculties were inactive?
Suppose I say, “I infer my senses were shut
down because they feel refreshed when I wake
up.” But here the same basic problem repeats
itself. How do I know or establish that there is a
relationship between my senses feeling refreshed
and  their  previously  having  been  inactive?
Would I not need to have some experience of
knowing  that  my  senses  were  inoperative  to-
gether with an experience of knowing I feel re-
freshed  in  order  to  establish  a  relationship
between the two? But while I am asleep I do
not have any experience of knowing my senses
are inactive; I know this only upon awakening.
So how do I establish this relationship? If I ap-
peal to yet another inference, then it looks like I
am headed off on an infinite regress.
More generally, the only way I can know
that  the  means for  knowledge were absent  in
deep  sleep  is  by  knowing  that  there  was  no
knowledge present in this state. Only by know-
ing the effect—my not knowing anything—can I
infer the cause—the absence of the means for
knowledge. So unless I already know what the
inference  is  trying  to  establish—that  I  knew
nothing—I cannot establish the reason on which
the inference relies.
The Advaita Vedānta conclusion is that I
know on the basis of  memory, not inference,
that  I  knew nothing in  deep  sleep.  In  other
words,  I  remember  having  not  known  any-
thing.  But  a  memory  is  of  something  previ-
ously experienced, so the not-knowing must be
experiential.
It  is  important  to  highlight  the  larger
metaphysical disputes about the self and cogni-
tion that drive this debate. For the Naiyāyikas,
the  self  is  a  non-physical  substance.  Unlike
Descartes, however, who held that consciousness
is  the  essence  of  the  non-physical  mind,  the
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Naiyāyikas  maintain that  the  self  is  the sub-
stratum of consciousness and that consciousness
is  an  adventitious  quality  of  this  substratum
that is present only given the appropriate causal
conditions, namely when the sensory and men-
tal faculties are functioning to cognize objects.
In addition, cognition consists in the taking of a
separate object as content and never in taking
itself as its own content.5 (In the case of intro-
spection, a second-order cognition takes a separ-
ate first-order cognition as its object.) For the
Advaitins, however,  the self  is  pure conscious-
ness, that is, sheer witnessing awareness distinct
from any changing cognitive state. Thus, unlike
the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins cannot allow that
consciousness  disappears  in  dreamless  sleep,
since they think (as do the Naiyāyikas) that it
is  one  and  the  same  self  who  goes  to  sleep,
wakes up, and remembers having gone to sleep.
In addition, for the Advaitins, cognition consists
in a reflexive awareness of its own occurrence as
an independent prerequisite for the cognition of
objects (Ram-Prasad 2007). In other words, the
defining  feature  of  cognition  is  reflexivity  or
self-luminosity, not intentionality (object-direc-
tedness),  which  is  adventitious.  Thus,  during
dreamless sleep, although object-directed cogni-
tion is absent, consciousness as reflexive and ob-
jectless awareness remains present.
It may help to use the modal notions of
necessity and possibility to describe the differ-
ence between these views. For the Naiyāyikas,
to be in a conscious state is to be in an object-
directed state. Given that dreamless sleep is not
an  object-directed  state,  it  is  necessarily  the
case  that  consciousness  is  absent  from  this
state.  Nevertheless,  if  it  could be  shown that
object-directed cognition can occur in dreamless
sleep, then the Nyāya could allow for the pos-
sibility of consciousness during dreamless sleep.
Such consciousness, however, would have to be
intermittent  or  episodic,  since  object-directed
cognitions come and go. What the Nyāya can-
not  allow is  that  consciousness  is  intrinsically
reflexive  or  self-revealing  (self-luminous),  or
that it  can occur without an object.  Further-
more,  for  the Nyāya,  consciousness  requires  a
5 See Ram-Prasad (2007, Ch. 2) for discussion of the different Indian
views about the nature of cognition and consciousness.
substratum,  since  consciousness  is  a  mental
quality,  and mental  qualities  require  the  sub-
stratum of the self. Therefore, although the self
continues to be present during dreamless sleep,
consciousness  is  absent.  The  Advaitins  agree
with the Naiyāyikas that the self remains con-
tinuously  present  during  dreamless  sleep,  but
they maintain that the self is pure consciousness
—consciousness  as  intrinsically  reflexive  and
self-revealing, not as contingently and adventi-
tiously  object-directed.  So,  for  the  Advaitins,
consciousness  cannot  ever  be  absent  from
dreamless sleep, which is to say that it is neces-
sarily  the  case  that  consciousness  is  present
throughout dreamless sleep. 
Given these differences, the Nyāya might
be  thought  to  be  more  flexible  than  Advaita
Vedānta with regard to the specific issue about
dreamless sleep, since the Nyāya can allow for
the possibility of intermittent consciousness dur-
ing dreamless  sleep,  whereas Advaita Vedānta
cannot allow for any absence of consciousness in
this state.
Despite  this  limitation  of  the  Advaita
Vedāntan view, it is possible to extract a key
phenomenological  idea  from  its  metaphysical
commitments. This idea is that when I wake up
from  a  dreamless  sleep,  it  seems  that  I  can
sometimes knowingly say I  have just  emerged
from a dreamless sleep, and this saying seems to
be a reporting of my awareness, not the product
of having to reason things out (Kesarcordi-Wat-
son 1981).  It  is  this  thought  that  provides  a
premise of the Advaita Vedāntan argument for
consciousness continuing in dreamless sleep, and
this  thought  is  logically  distinct  from  the
Vedāntan belief that the self is essentially pure
consciousness.
This  phenomenological  thought,  however,
is open to the objection that, given an apparent
memory, it does not follow that the state appar-
ently remembered was consciously experienced.
For example, we may have apparent memories
of childhood events, yet their presence does not
imply that these events were consciously experi-
enced,  for  the  memory  impressions  may have
been  acquired  from other  sources  of  informa-
tion, such as things our parents told us or fam-
ily  photographs.  Similarly,  during  dreamless
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sleep,  information  may  accumulate  non-con-
sciously from a variety of interoceptive and ex-
teroceptive  sources,  and  upon  awakening  we
may realize  that  something  was  going  in  our
mind while we were asleep, though at the time
we had no experience of it.
At  one  level—the  level  of  the  empirical
psychology of memory—we can make the same
reply here that we made above to the objection
to the Yoga argument, namely that all the argu-
ment requires is  the possibility of there being
genuine  veridical  episodic  memories  upon
awakening of having been peacefully asleep; the
argument does not need to establish that every
apparent waking memory is such a memory. Un-
like  remote  memory (of  the  sort  we have  for
childhood events) or semantic memory (memory
for learned facts or words), episodic memory is
standardly taken to require that the events “en-
coded” in memory are experienced at the time
of encoding. So, if there are possible cases upon
awakening in which there is any kind of genuine
episodic  memory  “retrieval”  of  the  dreamless-
sleep state, it follows that in such cases some-
thing  about  the  state  of  being  dreamlessly
asleep must have been experientially encoded. 
At  another  level—the  level  of  cross-cul-
tural  philosophy of  mind—we can  see  in  the
Vedāntan phenomenology the basis  of  a  tran-
scendental argument. Transcendental arguments
aim to deduce what must be the case in order
for some aspect of our experience to be possible.
In  the  present  case,  the  aspect  of  experience
with which we are concerned is not simply that
we sleep but that we know that we sleep. What
are  the  necessary  conditions  of  possibility  for
this kind of self-knowledge? To put the question
in a more phenomenological way, how is it pos-
sible for you as a conscious subject to experi-
ence yourself  as one and the same being who
falls  asleep,  who does not  actively know any-
thing  in  being asleep,  and who emerges  from
sleep  into  waking  life?  The Vedāntan view is
that a retrospective inference across the gap of
a  complete  absence  of  consciousness  will  not
suffice to make this kind of unified self-experi-
ence possible. Rather, you must have some kind
of  experiential  acquaintance  with  dreamless
sleep as a mode of your conscious being.
We  can  take  a  further  step  and  think
about the Vedāntan argument not just from a
Kantian  transcendental  perspective  but  also
from a Husserlian transcendental phenomenolo-
gical  perspective.  From  this  perspective,  the
core of the Vedāntan argument concerns not so
much episodic memory in the sense of the dis-
tinct mental act of recollection but rather what
Husserl calls “retention”—the holding onto the
just-past as an intentional content belonging to
our consciousness of the passage of time, includ-
ing our own mental lives as flowing in time. The
Advaita Vedāntan thought is that, at the mo-
ment of waking up, I can experience by reten-
tional awareness my having just been asleep and
my having not  known anything.  What Nyāya
fails to see, according to Vedānta, is that I need
this  kind of  retentional  awareness  in order  to
have the first-person knowledge that I slept and
to  ground  any  retrospective  inference  I  may
subsequently make.
Of course, even if we suppose that there is
or can be such a direct memory in the form of a
retentional  awareness  of  the  deep  sleep  state,
the presence of such a memory would not suffice
to prove the continuous presence of conscious-
ness throughout the entirety of dreamless sleep.
After all, the presence of such a memory seems
compatible with there having been moments or
periods  during  which  consciousness  vanishes
completely, with the sleeper remembering only
the  later  smoothed-out  and  mentally-merged,
conscious parts of sleep. Nevertheless, if dream-
less sleep allows for or includes phases in which
awareness is present, then this state cannot be
defined as one in which consciousness is absent.
Another  important  Advaita  Vedāntan
thought is that when I say I just woke up from
a dreamless sleep, the first-person pronoun does
not refer to my autobiographical self—my self
as I represent it in personal memory. Rather, it
picks out my consciousness or subjectivity itself.
To use a phenomenological idiom, it picks out
the “ipseity” or minimal selfhood of conscious-
ness in contrast to the ego as a mentally repres-
ented  object  of  memory  or  reflection.  But
whereas  the  Advaitin  takes  this  minimal  self-
hood to be a transcendental “witness conscious-
ness” (Gupta 1998), it is open to us today to
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maintain that it is my embodied self or bodily
subjectivity,  or  what  phenomenologists  would
call my “pre-personal lived body.” In this way,
we  may  be  able  to  remove  the  Advaita
Vedāntan conception of dreamless sleep from its
native metaphysical framework and graft it onto
a naturalist conception of the embodied mind—
a  conception  that  should  also  appeal  to  the
Cārvāka  or  naturalist  school  of  Indian  philo-
sophy (see Ganeri 2012, pp. 69–97), besides be-
ing tractable for cognitive science.
Cognitive science is also relevant to an in-
teresting disagreement between Yoga and Ad-
vaita Vedānta concerning cognitive activity dur-
ing dreamless sleep. Advaita Vedānta maintains
that cognitive activity ceases during dreamless
sleep and only consciousness remains,  whereas
Yoga maintains that cognitive activity continues
during dreamless sleep (see Dasgupta 1922, pp.
460–61). To understand this difference it is im-
portant to note that both traditions distinguish
between consciousness, which is the self-lumin-
ous (reflexive) and passive witnessing awareness,
and the mind, which is the intentional or ob-
ject-grasping cognitive system. Moreover, in the
Yoga view, the mind is material, and so is not
different  from the  body (see  Schweizer 1993).
According to Yoga, deep sleep is a subtle or re-
duced state of the mind, specifically of the “in-
ner sense” (antaḥkaraṇa), which includes both
mental cognition (manas,  which processes and
integrates sensory material, and  buddhi,  which
intellectually discriminates and judges) and the
sense  of  ego  (ahaṃkāra,  the  feeling,  “I  am”).
Thus, for Yoga, cognitive activity, particularly
the formation of memories, continues sublimin-
ally in deep sleep, and this process is physical or
physiological.  According  to  Advaita  Vedānta,
however, the mind, specifically the inner mental
sense, shuts down entirely in deep sleep, leaving
only  the  passive  “witness  consciousness”  and
the life processes of the body. If we set aside the
question of consciousness and ask whether cog-
nitive  activity,  specifically  memory  formation,
occurs during deep sleep, the answer from cog-
nitive science is unequivoval, for evidence from
psychology  and  neuroscience  indicates  that
memory processes are strongly present in deep
sleep (Diekelmann & Born 2010; Walker 2009).
These processes include both passive and active
forms of memory consolidation (the strengthen-
ing of newly-acquired memories and the integra-
tion of them with older ones). Of course, this
kind of memory consolidation is thought to oc-
cur in the absence of consciousness, so this evid-
ence does not support the Yoga and Vedāntan
view that consciousness continues in dreamless
sleep.  Nevertheless,  the evidence does support
the Yoga view that physiologically-instantiated
cognitive processes continue in dreamless sleep,
contrary to both Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya,
which believe the mind shuts down in dreamless
sleep.
The claim that mental activity ceases in
dreamless sleep while consciousness remains cre-
ates another difficulty for the Advaita Vedāntan
view.  If  the  inner  sense  stops  functioning  in
dreamless  sleep,  then  how  is  the  waking
memory, “I slept peacefully and I did not know
anything,”  formed?  Episodic  memory  requires
the encoding of experience, so if there is no ex-
perience of “I” in dreamless sleep, then how can
I remember that I slept well?
The Advaita Vedānta answer is clever (see
Dasgupta 1922,  pp.  460–461).  In  deep  and
dreamless sleep, ignorance completely envelops
the mind. Since the ego sense is inoperative, it
doesn’t appropriate this ignorance to itself,  so
there is no feeling of the ignorance belonging to
an “I.” At the moment of awakening, however,
the ego sense, grounded on the felt presence of
the body, reactivates, and the mind starts up its
cognitive workings. Immediately, the ego sense
appropriates the lingering impression or reten-
tion of  not-knowing and associates  this reten-
tion  with  itself,  thereby  generating  the  retro-
spective thought, “I did not know anything.” 
From the Vedānta. perspective, this “I” is
not the true self; it consists in a mistaken super-
imposition of the self onto the mind-body com-
plex. The true self  is the egoless “witness con-
sciousness” (egoless, because it is not a function
of the ego sense). The Advaitin take this “witness
consciousness” to be transcendental and not es-
sentially embodied. It is open to us today, how-
ever, to suppose that if there is some kind of ego-
less and basal consciousness that can continue to
be present in dreamless sleep, then it is a funda-
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mentally embodied consciousness, perhaps a min-
imal mode of sentience consisting in the feeling of
being  alive.  This  thought  provides  another  ex-
ample of how it may be possible to separate the
Advaita Vedāntan conception of consciousness in
dreamless  sleep  from  its  original  metaphysical
framework and graft it onto a contemporary nat-
uralist conception of the embodied mind.
If  we project some terminology from con-
temporary philosophy of mind onto Yoga and Ad-
vaita Vedānta, then we can say that dreamless
sleep counts for these Indian philosophers as a
“phenomenal  state”  or  a  state  of  “phenomenal
consciousness”—a state that  has a phenomenal
character or for which there is something it is like
to be in that state. What is it like? Yoga and
Vedānta  describe  deep  and  dreamless  sleep  as
peaceful, as one undifferentiated awareness not di-
vided up into a sense of being a distinct subject
aware of a distinct object, and as blissfully un-
knowing.  From a  contemporary  naturalist  per-
spective, this conception could be taken as a de-
scription of a quiescent and tranquil form of sen-
tience or the feeling of being alive. Under this de-
scription, dreamless sleep would not count as a
state  of  “access  consciousness”—a  state  whose
phenomenal content or character we can cognit-
ively access, hold in working memory, and use to
guide our  attention  and thinking.  We seem to
have no cognitive access to being asleep during
sleep; rather, we gain access retrospectively in the
waking  state.  On this  conception,  in  dreamless
sleep we are phenomenally aware but we have no
cognitive access to that awareness at the time.
Ultimately, however, this way of conceptu-
ally parsing the Yoga and Vedāntan view will not
work.  A  central  commitment  of  Yoga  and
Vedānta, as well  as Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, is
that we can gain access to the state of dreamless
sleep through meditative mental training. I will
come back to this idea at the end of this paper.
But first we need to consider the default view of
consciousness  and  dreamless  sleep  in  cognitive
neuroscience.
4 Assessing the default view
Why  have  neuroscientists  thought  that  con-
sciousness disappears during dreamless sleep?
One reason comes from the reports  that
people  give  when  they  are  woken  up  from
NREM (non-Rapid Eye Movement) sleep, espe-
cially when the EEG shows slow waves in the
delta frequency range (0.5–4 Hertz) during sleep
stages  3  and  4  (so-called  slow-wave  sleep).
When  given  the  instruction,  “report  anything
that was going through your mind just before
waking  up,”  people  tend to  report  short  and
fragmentary thoughts or not being able to re-
member anything at all (Nielsen 2000; Tononi &
Koch 2008, p. 243).  On the basis of  such re-
ports, scientists conclude that the sleepers were
aware of little or nothing at all prior to being
woken up, and hence that slow-wave sleep is a
state of reduced or absent consciousness.
We need to be cautious here, however. The
fact that one has no memory of some period of
time does not necessarily imply that one lacked
all consciousness during that time. One might
have been conscious—in the sense of undergoing
qualitative  states  or  processes  of  sentience  or
awareness—but for one reason or another one
was not able to form the kind of memories that
later one can retrieve and verbally report.
This  point  is  familiar  to  scientists  who
study the effects of anaesthetics (Alkire et al.
2008). At certain doses, some anaesthetics pre-
vent  memory  formation  while  sparing  aware-
ness.  Near  the  threshold  of  unconsciousness,
some anaesthetics  block working memory,  but
patients may still be aware and fail to respond
because they immediately forget what to do. At
lower doses, patients under general anaesthesia
can  sometimes  carry  on  a  conversation  using
hand signals, but after the operation they deny
ever being awake.
Although dreamless sleep and anaesthesia
are not the same condition, the general point
that  retrospective  oblivion  does  not  prove  a
prior  lack  of  consciousness  must  be  kept  in
mind  whenever  we  are  tempted  to  infer  that
consciousness  is  absent  in  deep  sleep  because
people report not being able to remember any-
thing when they are woken up. 
We also need to think about the kinds of
verbal  reports  that  people  are asked to make
when they are woken up in the sleep lab. The
instruction to report  “anything going through
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your mind just  before waking up” encourages
you to direct your attention and memory to the
objects  of  your  awareness—to  anything  you
might  have  been  thinking  about.  But  what
about the felt qualities or phenomenal character
of your state of awareness? A different instruc-
tion would be to report “anything you were feel-
ing just before waking up.” This instruction en-
courages  you  to  direct  your  attention  and
memory to the felt quality of your sleep. Did
you have any feeling of being aware? Was your
sleep peaceful and clear, or was it agitated, rest-
less, or sluggish? Or do you have no impression
of  any  feeling  or  quality  of  awareness?  The
point here is to guide people away from focusing
exclusively  on  the  intentional  objects  of  con-
sciousness, which may be absent in deep sleep,
and to orient them towards the felt qualities or
phenomenal character of awareness itself.
Another  reason  neuroscientists  think  that
consciousness  fades  away  in  deep  sleep  comes
from comparing brain activity during slow-wave
sleep with brain activity during waking conscious-
ness. For example, during wakefulness, when an
electrical pulse is used to stimulate a small region
of the brain, the pulse generates an EEG response
that lasts for 300 milliseconds and that is made
up of rapidly changing waves that propagate in
specific directions over long distances in the cor-
tex (Massimini et al. 2005;  Tononi & Massimini
2008). During deep sleep, however, although the
initial  EEG  response  to  the  stimulation  is
stronger than during wakefulness, the response re-
mains localized to the stimulated region instead
of travelling to distant regions, and it lasts only
150 milliseconds.  In  short,  whereas  the  waking
brain  responds  to  stimulation  with  a  complex
pattern of large-scale activity across many inter-
connected regions, the deeply sleeping brain re-
sponds  with  localized  and  short-lived  activity.
These  findings  are  interpreted as  showing that
“effective connectivity”—the ability of neural sys-
tems  to  influence  each  other—breaks  down  in
deep sleep. As a result, “large-scale integration”
(Varela et al. 2001) in the brain cannot happen—
that is, the brain cannot generate the kinds of dy-
namically-changing large-scale patterns of activity
that are known to characterize consciousness in
the waking state.
But what is it about the loss of effective
connectivity  and  large-scale  integration  that
makes neuroscientists  think that consciousness
disappears in deep sleep? To put the question
another  way,  what  is  the  connection  between
the presence of consciousness and the presence
of effective connectivity and large-scale integra-
tion?
To  answer  this  question,  neuroscientists
usually rely on the idea that a content of con-
sciousness is a reportable content, and that re-
portable contents are ones that can be atten-
tionally selected, held in working memory, and
used to guide thought and action. Such cognit-
ive  processes—selective  attention,  working
memory,  sequential  thought,  and  action  guid-
ance—require  the  large-scale  integration  of
brain activity.
One  of  the  more  theoretically-principled
versions of this idea is  Giulio Tononi’s “integ-
rated  information  theory”  of  consciousness
(2008).  According  to  this  theory,  any  typical
conscious experience has two crucial properties.
First, it is highly “informative,” in the technical
sense that it rules out a huge number of altern-
ative  experiences.  Even  an  apparently  simple
conscious experience, such as lying on your back
and seeing the clear blue sky throughout your
whole visual field, is richly informative in the
sense that it rules out a vast number of other
experiences  you  could  have  had  at  that  mo-
ment. Second, the experience is highly “integ-
rated,”  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  be  sub-
divided into parts that you experience on their
own, such as the top and bottom portions of
your visual field, or the color and the space of
the sky.
Given this model of consciousness as “in-
tegrated information,” Tononi proposes that the
level  of  consciousness  of  a  system at  a  given
time is a matter of how many possible states
(information) are available to the system as a
whole (integration). In the waking state, many
possible states are available to the whole system
(the system is rich in integrated information),
whereas in deep sleep this repertoire drastically
shrinks to just a few states (the system is poor
in integrated information). Transposed onto the
brain, the idea is that during slow-wave sleep
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there is a massive loss of integrated information
in  the  brain.  Effective  connectivity  breaks
down, leaving isolated islands that cannot talk
to  each  other  (loss  of  integration),  while  the
repertoire of possible states contracts to a few
largely  uniform  states  (loss  of  information).
Hence, according to the integrated information
model, deep sleep is a state where consciousness
reduces to a very low level  or  disappears  en-
tirely.
Although the integrated information the-
ory offers a useful way of  thinking about the
qualitative richness and coherence of conscious-
ness in informational terms, the theory has seri-
ous limitations as a theory of phenomenal con-
sciousness, so it would be a mistake to use the
theory to rule out the possibility of conscious-
ness during dreamless sleep.
Despite  Tononi’s  bold  claim  that  “con-
sciousness is one and the same thing as integ-
rated information” (2008, p. 232), integrated in-
formation does not seem sufficient for conscious-
ness.  On  the  one  hand,  even  simple  systems
have some degree of integrated information, so
the equation of consciousness and integrated in-
formation  implies  that  even  simple  systems,
such as a photodiode, have some degree of con-
sciousness. On the other hand, complex digital
computers can possess a high amount of integ-
rated  information.  Yet  neither  system is  con-
scious (at least the attribution of consciousness
to such systems seems highly implausible) (see
Searle 2013). As  Ned Block (2009) points out,
the integrated information theory fails to distin-
guish between intelligence, in the sense of being
able to solve complex problems by integrating
multiple sources of information, and conscious-
ness, in the sense of sentience or felt awareness
(phenomenal  consciousness).  Since  integrated
information  does  not  seem  sufficient  for  con-
sciousness—let alone identical to it—the pres-
ence or absence of integrated information can-
not be the crucial mark of whether a state is
conscious or not conscious.
We also need to keep in mind the distinc-
tion  between  “phenomenal  consciousness”  and
“access consciousness.” To be phenomenally con-
scious  means to be in  a state that  has some
subjective or phenomenal character. To be ac-
cess  conscious  means  to  be  in  a  state  where
there  is  cognitive  access  to  the  contents  of
awareness. Whether a state’s being phenomen-
ally conscious requires that it be cognitively ac-
cessible is currently a matter of debate (Block
2011;  Cohen & Dennett 2011). Although large-
scale integration in the cortex is crucial for cog-
nitively accessed or reported conscious experi-
ence, it  may not be crucial  for every kind of
phenomenal consciousness; for example, it may
not be crucial for the kind of cognitively unac-
cessed  consciousness  that  Yoga  and  Vedānta
maintain is present in dreamless sleep (though
they also maintain,  as we shall  see,  that  this
kind  of  consciousness  is  accessible  if  one  is
highly trained in certain types of meditation).
The upshot of  this critical  assessment of
the default view is that neither the subjective
report data nor the objective neurophysiological
data  suffice  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a
subtle mode of phenomenal consciousness occur-
ring in certain phases of dreamless sleep. To put
the point  another  way,  the  sleep  science  con-
struct  of  “dreamless  sleep,”  defined  electro-
physiologically  as  slow-wave  sleep,  may  need
phenomenological refinement. We need to allow
for  the  possibility  that  certain  types  of  slow-
wave sleep may have a phenomenal character—
a possibility that could in turn lead to refine-
ments  in  the  physiological  construct  of  slow-
wave sleep. It follows from these considerations
that  the  standard  neuroscientific  definition  of
consciousness  as  “that  which  disappears  in
dreamless  sleep  and reappears  in  waking  and
dreaming states” is not acceptable. At the very
least,  it  needs  qualification  in  light  of  the
present considerations, and it may need to be
either  substantially  revised  or  abandoned  in
light of further research.
The case of dreamless sleep suggests that
we need to allow at least for the possibility of
there being modes of phenomenal consciousness
that  may not  be  cognitively  accessible  in  the
usual  ways.  At  the  same  time,  Yoga  and
Vedānta,  as  well  as  Indo-Tibetan  Buddhism,
maintain that aspects of the mind in deep and
dreamless sleep can become cognitively access-
ible through meditative mental training. This is
the last topic I wish to discuss. My main point
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will be that considering sleep from this contem-
plative angle  suggests  new experimental  ques-
tions  and  protocols  for  the  cognitive  neuros-
cience of sleep and consciousness.
5 New experimental questions and 
protocols
In juxtaposing the Indian and neuroscience con-
ceptions of deep sleep, I have proceeded so far
as if the Indian notion of dreamless sleep corres-
ponds to NREM slow-wave sleep. But we can
now  see  that  this  correspondence  is  too
simplistic. The Indian conception of dreamless
sleep suggests that we need a finer taxonomy of
sleep  states—a  taxonomy  that  is  not  just
physiological  but  also  phenomenological,  and
that accommodates the ways that sleep may be
culturally variable as well as flexible and train-
able through meditative practices.
Consider that the fourth century C.E. au-
thor, Vyāsa, in his commentary on Patañjali’s
Yoga Sūtras,  distinguishes three types of sleep
that  are  recalled  upon  awakening—peaceful
sleep, disturbed sleep, and heavy sleep. Accord-
ing to the cosmology that informs Yoga, these
three types of sleep result from whichever one of
the  three  qualities  or  tendencies  (guṇas)  pre-
dominates in the psychophysical complex. Over-
all,  the quality of dullness or the tendency to
inactivity (tamas) dominates the mind in ordin-
ary  sleep.  Sleep  is  heavy  or  stupefying  when
this quality is not modified by either of the two
other qualities or tendencies. Sleep is disturbed
and restless when the quality of  excitation or
tendency  to  activity  (rajas)  is  present.  And
sleep is peaceful and refreshing when the quality
of  lightness  or  tendency  to  clarity  (sattva)  is
present.  When  the  Vedānta  philosophers  de-
scribe deep and dreamless sleep as blissful, it is
deep sleep, with this quality of clarity, that they
have in mind.
When  sleep-lab  participants  are  roused
from NREM sleep, however, they sometimes re-
port that they have been thinking while they
were  asleep,  and  often  they  describe  going
around in a repetitive loop of rumination. Al-
though  this  kind  of  thinking  probably  occurs
mainly in stage 2 NREM sleep, it is also repor-
ted  during  awakenings  from deeper  slow-wave
sleep.
Owen Flanagan appeals to this finding to
argue that there is no such thing as dreamless
sleep and hence no sleep completely lacking in
consciousness ( 2000). Contrary to the standard
neuroscience view, Flanagan thinks we are al-
ways conscious while asleep because we are al-
ways dreaming. Dreaming, he proposes, is any
conscious  mental  activity  occurring  during
sleep, not just mental activity involving sensory
imagery.  If  ruminative  thinking  occurring  in
NREM sleep  counts  as  dreaming,  and  if  this
kind of mental activity can happen during slow-
wave sleep, then all sleep stages involve dream-
ing and at least some degree of consciousness.
From the Indian perspective, however, we
need  to  distinguish  clearly  between  two
things. One is whether there is such a thing as
dreamless sleep; the other is  whether we are
conscious  while  we sleep.  Yoga and Vedānta
agree  that  consciousness  is  present  while  we
sleep,  but this  is  not because we are always
dreaming, even if we define “dreaming” widely
to mean any kind of thinking during sleep. On
the contrary, what Yoga and Vedānta mean by
“dreamless  sleep,”  as  we  have  seen,  is  that
sleep state in  which there are no sensory or
mental  objects  of  awareness,  that  is,  no  im-
ages  and  no  thoughts.  Nevertheless,  they
maintain, there is awareness, so this state is a
conscious state; it is a mode of consciousness
without an object.
In the Yoga framework, reports of rumin-
ative  thinking  upon  awakening  indicate  a
coarser or shallower sleep state—one closer to
the  surface  of  thinking  consciousness—and  a
state  with  a  strong  quality  of  excitation  or
tendency toward movement of the mind.
Consider  now the reasons that sleep sci-
entist J. Allan Hobson gives for doubting the re-
liability of waking reports of ruminative think-
ing during slow-wave sleep:
Reports of antecedent mental activity eli-
cited following awakenings from deep sleep
are  rendered  unreliable  by the  brain  fog
through which they must pass […]. Even if
the deeply sleeping brain were capable of
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the  low-level  ruminations  sometimes  im-
plied  by  experimental  reports,  it  is  un-
likely that they would survive the inertia
of awakening. It may even be that the tu-
mult of the awakening process triggers the
chaotic and fragmentary mentation that is
reported. And even when deep sleepers are
sufficiently aroused to be interviewed, they
may still generate huge slow waves in their
EEGs, indicating that they are in a semis-
tuporous state quite different from either
sleeping or waking. Indeed, they may even
hallucinate, become anxious, and confabu-
late as if they suffered from delirium. This
is precisely what happens in the night ter-
rors of children. (1999, pp. 142–143)
Clearly,  this too is  a far cry from the Indian
conception of dreamless sleep. Neither reports of
ruminative  thinking  nor  waking  hallucinatory
confabulations  correspond  to  the  Yoga  and
Vedāntan descriptions of  dreamless  sleep as a
peaceful or blissful state free of mental activity,
from which  one awakens  feeling alert  and re-
freshed. From the Yoga perspective, what Hob-
son describes are sleep states strongly marked
by a quality of dullness combined with mental
excitation upon awakening.
My point here is not at all that sleep sci-
ence  should  refine  its  taxonomy  using  the
Yoga framework.  It  is  rather that ultimately
we cannot map the Indian notion of dreamless
sleep  using  already-established  scientific  cat-
egories,  especially  the  physiologically-defined
sleep stages, which, even from a scientific per-
spective,  are now recognized as too crude to
capture  the  moment-to-moment  dynamics  of
electrical brain activity during sleep, let alone
the experiences with which they may be cor-
related (Nir &  Tononi 2009). Not only is the
Indian  notion  phenomenological  and  meta-
physical,  rather than physiological,  it  is  also
embedded in a normative framework that un-
derstands sleep in contemplative terms. So, to
bridge from sleep science and the neuroscience
of  consciousness  to  the  Indian  conception  of
dreamless  sleep,  we need  to  view sleep  as  a
mode of being that is trainable through med-
itation.
From  the  Yoga  perspective,  entering  a
state of  blissful dreamless sleep on a regular
basis requires leading a calm and peaceful life
guided by the  fundamental  value of  nonviol-
ence  (ahiṃsā),  practicing  daily  meditation,
and treating going to sleep and waking up as
themselves  occasions  for  meditation—for
watching  the  mind as  it  enters  and emerges
from sleep. 
In addition, from a yogic perspective, we
need to distinguish between ordinary dream-
less sleep and lucid dreamless sleep. Ordinary
dreamless  sleep  is  the  sleep  of  ignorance,  in
which awareness is described as being in total
darkness.  Lucid  dreamless  sleep  is  described
as a state in which awareness is luminous and
without  an object  (free  of  thoughts  and im-
ages).  Whereas  lucid  dreaming  consists  in
knowing that you are dreaming, lucid dream-
less  sleep is  said to consist  in  being able  to
witness the state of dreamless sleep and recall
its  phenomenal  clarity  upon  waking  up.  Al-
though the background metaphysics of Yoga,
Vedānta, and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism differ in
significant  ways,  they  all  describe  lucid
dreamless sleep as disclosing a basal level of
pre-personal  consciousness  that  lies  deeper
than the modes of awareness that characterize
the ego-centred waking and dreaming states.6
At this  point  you may wonder whether
we have strayed back into the realm of meta-
physics.  Does  this  conception  of  dreamless
sleep really have any descriptive phenomenolo-
gical content or is it simply a consequence of
the  Indian  metaphysical  views  that  identify
the  true  self  with  pure  consciousness  (as  in
the  case  of  Vedānta)  or  that  maintain  that
there is no self but only an ownerless stream
of  consciousness  that  continues  in  dreamless
sleep (as in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism)?
From  a  purely  textual  perspective,  the
metaphysical  and  the  phenomenological  are
thoroughly  intertwined  in  the  Indian  discus-
sions.  From  a  cognitive  science  perspective,
however, we can ask whether the idea of indu-
cing  lucid  dreamless  sleep  through  certain
types of meditation is experimentally testable,
6 For further discussion, see Thompson (2014).
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and, more generally, whether meditation is as-
sociated  with  altered  sleep  patterns  or  has
measurable effects on sleep. Two neuroscience
studies of sleep in relation to meditation are
suggestive in this regard.
One recent study comes from the laborat-
ories  of  Giulio  Tononi  and  Richard  Davidson
(Ferrarelli et  al. 2013).  They  examined  slow-
wave  sleep  in  highly  experienced  Theravāda
Buddhist  and  Tibetan  Buddhist  meditation
practitioners.  They  found  that  the  long-term
meditators,  compared  to  non-meditators,  had
significantly  increased  fast-frequency  gamma
activity, as recorded by high-density EEG, in a
parietal-occipital  region  of  the  scalp  during
NREM sleep.  In  addition,  the  higher  gamma
activity  was  positively  correlated  with  the
length  of  meditation  training.  This  finding  is
notable  because  gamma-frequency  electrical
brain activity is a well-known neural marker of
conscious  cognitive  processes  (Tononi &  Koch
2008),  including  certain  types  of  meditative
states  in  long-term  meditation  practitioners
(Lutz et  al. 2004).  Gamma  activity  has  also
been shown to distinguish lucid dreaming from
non-lucid dreaming in REM sleep (Voss et al.
2009; see also  Voss &  Hobson this collection).
During NREM sleep, however, gamma activity
tends to decrease, so the higher gamma activity
in  the  meditators  could  reflect  a  capacity  to
maintain some level of awareness. More gener-
ally, the study suggests that there may be dis-
tinct  slow-wave  sleep  states  associated  with
meditation practices.
Another  older  study  examined long-term
practitioners  of  TM  (Transcendental  Medita-
tion) who reported what they called the sub-
jective experience of “witnessing” during sleep
(Mason et al. 1997). They described this experi-
ence as one of feeling a continuous and peaceful
awareness without dreams while one sleeps and
as  resulting  in  one’s  feeling  refreshed  upon
awakening. The main finding was that the long-
term  meditation  practitioners,  compared  to
short-term  practitioners  and  non-meditators,
showed a unique EEG pattern during slow-wave
sleep, one in which faster alpha and theta waves
were superimposed on the slower delta waves.
Although  we  cannot  draw  clear  conclusions
about what these distinctive physiological pat-
terns mean, including whether they are due to
TM practice or some other cause, the authors of
the  study  interpret  them  as  supporting  the
presence of a different kind of slow-wave sleep
state  in  individuals  who  report  witnessing  of
sleep.
These two studies reinforce the point that
we  cannot  use  already  established  categories
from sleep science to map the Indian conception
of dreamless sleep. This conception, besides be-
ing  closely  tied  to  a  specific  phenomenology,
which in turn reflects a specific metaphysics, is
embedded  in  a  normative  cultural  framework
that aims to bring about and promote certain
kinds of contemplative sleep states. Instead of
trying  to  fit  these  states  into  a  physiological
scheme derived from studying the way twenti-
eth-century Americans and Europeans sleep in
the sleep lab, we need to enlarge the conceptual
framework of  sleep science to include contem-
plative ways of training the sleeping mind. This
project will require that sleep scientists, cognit-
ive  neuroscientists,  cognitive  anthropologists,
and Western and Indian philosophers work to-
gether to map the sleeping mind. In short, we
need  a  cross-cultural  cognitive  science  and
neurophenomenology (Lutz &  Thompson 2003)
of the wake–sleep cycle, one that draws on the
combined expertise of Western and Asian theor-
etical traditions.
One benefit of such a cross-cultural cognit-
ive science is that it could offer new data relevant
to our guiding question about consciousness and
dreamless sleep. Consider the following testable,
neurophenomenological hypothesis:  In highly-ex-
perienced practitioners of certain types of medita-
tion, compared to individuals without this kind of
experience, we should observe a stronger correla-
tion  between  subjective  reports  of  phenomenal
qualities of sleep and various objective measures
of brain activity. Specifically, if highly experienced
meditators  were  able  to  provide  reports  upon
awakening about qualities of their experience of
the state they call dreamless sleep, and if cognit-
ive neuroscientists were able to relate these re-
ports to fine-grained features of sleep physiology
and to familiar aspects of the neural correlates of
consciousness, then we would have new evidence
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from experimental science that a certain type of
dreamless sleep in certain individuals counts as a
mode  of  phenomenal  consciousness  whose  felt
qualities can be made accessible to verbal report.7
This  hypothesis  also  cast  lights  on  our
earlier  discussion  of  sleep-state  misperception.
From a contemplative perspective, when little at-
tention is given to sleep as an occasion for the
practice of mindfulness, it is not surprising that
sleep-state perception will be unreliable, even in
ordinary individuals, let alone patients suffering
from insomnia or other sleep disorders. In con-
trast, sleep-state perception may be more reliable
when sleep is valued in a contemplative way and
is treated as an opportunity for cultivating mind-
fulness. Whether these assumptions are correct is
something that neurophenomenology should test.
6 Conclusion
The definition  of  consciousness  as  “that  which
disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when
we wake up or dream” is unsatisfactory. It rules
out the possibility of states or phases of dreamless
sleep  in  which  some  kind  of  consciousness  is
present.  A strong case for taking seriously this
possibility can be constructed by combining re-
sources  found  in  Indian  philosophy,  Western
philosophy of mind, the neuroscience of conscious-
ness, and sleep science. The main message of this
paper—besides  that  of  needing  to  revise  the
above definition of consciousness—is that we need
a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than the
one that  sleep  science  and the neuroscience  of
consciousness currently employ, and that contem-
plative methods of mind training are relevant for
advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and
consciousness.
7 For further discussion, see Thompson (2014).
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